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Abstract This paper focuses on English directional modified numerals up to n,
which triggers opposite inference patterns in speaker-uncertainty and authoritative-
permission contexts. I propose that these opposite inference patterns are due to
pragmatic inference about an unspecified semantic lower bound of up to n, based
on its similarities to gradable adjectives and vague characteristics. The value of the
semantic lower bound in different contexts is predicted by a general pragmatic prin-
ciple of interaction between informativity and applicability independently motivated
in previous probabilistic models on gradable adjectives.
Keywords: modified numerals, proximity inference, vagueness, optimal threshold model,
probabilistic semantics and pragmatics, informativity-applicability trade-off
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the semantics and pragmatics of English up to n expressions,
e.g., up to 100, which are called directional modified numerals in the literature
Nouwen (2010). The main goal is to account for the contrast in the minimal pair (1).
(1) a. You are about to meet up to 100 people.
b. You are allowed to meet up to 100 people.
On the one hand, (1a) is felicitous only in speaker-uncertainty contexts, where
the speaker does not know the exact number of people that the listener is about
to meet. A line of previous work has focused on how and why various types of
modified numerals exhibit or lack this requirement (e.g., Geurts & Nouwen 2007;
Büring 2008; Nouwen 2010; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013; Kennedy 2015). In
addition, as Blok (2015a,b) observes, up to n in (1a) triggers a proximity inference,
i.e., the speaker believes that the number of people is somewhere close to 100.
On the other hand, the most salient interpretation of (1b) is a permission to meet
a number of people within the full range from 0 to 100, granted by a speaker who
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has the authority.1 I will refer to this as the full-range inference in authoritative-
permission contexts.
We can see that in speaker-uncertainty and authoritative-permission contexts, up
to n triggers opposite inference patterns: while the proximity inference in speaker-
uncertainty contexts results in a narrow range of epistemic possibilities, the full-range
inference in authoritative-permission contexts contributes to a wide range of deontic
possibilities. A natural question arises: why and how does up to n trigger opposite
inference patterns in these two contexts?
To answer this question, in the rest of the paper, I will first argue that up to n
exhibits vagueness and highlight its similarities to vague gradable adjectives such as
tall. Based on these similarities, I propose that up to n has a contextually determined
semantic lower bound. Next I illustrate that the value of the semantic lower bound
in different contexts is predicted by a general pragmatic principle of interaction
between informativity and applicability independently motivated in previous work
on gradable adjectives (Lassiter & Goodman 2013, 2015; Qing & Franke 2014a,b),
and specify a probabilistic model that captures the opposite inference patterns.
2 Vagueness of up to n
In this section, I will apply Kennedy’s (2007) characteristics of vagueness to argue
that up to n exhibits vagueness, similar to vague gradable adjectives such as tall.
One main characteristic of vagueness is the existence of borderline cases and a
lack of sharp boundaries exhibited by graded judgments (2).2
(2) a. I expected John to be tall, but he is only/shorter than
5′5′′ /. . . / 5′10′′ / (?)6′ / ?6′2′′ / #7′ (tall).
b. I expected to meet up to 100 people, but only/fewer than
10 / . . . / 50 / (?)60 / ?75 / ??85 / #95 / #100 people are here.
The use of but in (2) indicates that the but-clause is not part of the speaker’s prior
expectation. Suppose John is a US adult male. Given that the speaker of (2a) had a
prior expectation of John being tall, 5′5′′ is felicitous in the but-clause because a 5′5′′
US adult male is generally not considered tall, i.e., 5′5′′ is not in the interpretation
of tall in (2a) and therefore not part of the speaker’s prior expectation. In contrast,
since 7′ is certainly in the interpretation of tall in (2a), it is part of the speaker’s prior
expectation, and therefore it is infelicitous to use 7′ in the but-clause. Meanwhile,
for a borderline case such as 6′, since it is unclear whether it is in the interpretation
of tall in (2a), it is harder to decide whether 6′ is felicitous in the but-clause.
1 When (1b) is used in a context in which the speaker is known to be uncertain about the exact number
of people the listener is allowed to meet, it triggers a proximity inference similar to (1a).
2 Example (2b) is adapted from Blok (2015a) and generalized to test non-zero numbers in the but-clause.
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We can see that up to n in (2b) patterns with tall in (2a): small numbers such as 10
are felicitous in the but-clause, suggesting that they are not part of the interpretation
of up to 100 in (2b). In contrast, large numbers close to 100, e.g., 95, are infelicitous
in the but-clause, suggesting that they are part of the interpretation of up to 100 in
(2b). And finally, for numbers in between, e.g., 60, it is hard to judge whether they
are felicitous in the but-clause, making them borderline cases for the interpretation
of up to 100 in (2b).
The choice of the borderline cases in (2b) is for illustrative purposes only. What is
crucial is that the judgments are graded. The following naturally occurring examples
in (3) further confirm that numbers small enough are felicitous in the but-clauses.
Given that large numbers close enough to the upper bound are infelicitous in the
but-clauses and we cannot identify sharp boundaries, there must be borderline cases
somewhere in between, although they may well be different from person to person.
(3) a. Vernell expected up to 10 vendors but only six materialized.
b. It anticipated up to 40 cases would be mediated, but realised only 12.
Another characteristic of vague expressions is that they are susceptible to sorites
paradoxes. For example, the premise that a 7′ US adult male is tall seems plausible.
So does the premise that a US adult male 0.5′′ shorter than a tall US adult male is
still tall. However, with these two premises it follows that a 5′5′′ US adult male is
also tall, which is implausible.
Now consider (4), a statement that former British Prime Minister David Cameron
made to the House of Commons on refugees from Syria.
(4) So Mr Speaker, we are proposing that Britain should resettle up to 20,000
Syrian refugees over the rest of this Parliament.
Given Cameron’s proposal, it seems that the argument (5) has two plausible
premises (5a) and (5b) and yet an implausible conclusion (5c).
(5) a. Taking 20,000 refugees fulfills the proposal.
b. ∀i, if taking i refugees fulfills the proposal, so does taking (i−1).
c. # Therefore, taking 1 refugee fulfills the proposal.
Again, we have seen that up to n patterns with tall and exhibits vagueness.
Large numbers close to the upper bound n are likely in its interpretation, very small
numbers are likely not in its interpretation, and the judgments are graded: the larger
the number, the more likely it is in the interpretation of up to n, but there is no
clear-cut boundary.
Such characteristics suggest an analysis of up to n that makes use of its similari-
ties to vague gradable adjectives. In the next section, I will incorporate this similarity
into the semantics of up to n.
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3 The semantics and pragmatics of up to n
In this section, I propose a semantics of up to n that incorporates its similarities to
vague gradable adjectives, and argue that the opposite inference patterns of up to n
is due to a pragmatic reasoning about the optimal lower bound.
3.1 An unspecified semantic lower bound
According to the degree-based semantics for gradable adjectives, the positive form of
a gradable adjective A introduces an unspecified, contextually determined standard of
comparison θ , such that x is A is true iff its degree of A-ness exceeds such a standard
(Cresswell 1977; von Stechow 1984; Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007).
For example, John is tall is true iff height(John)≥ θ . Therefore, depending on θ , a
degree d may or may not be part of the interpretation of the positive form. Assuming
that contexts generally provide a probability distribution of θ , one can derive the
probability of a degree d exceeding the standard θ to model the graded nature of
vagueness (Lassiter 2011). For example, suppose that the contextual standard for
being tall is uniformly distributed between 5′11′′ and 6′1′′. Small degrees such as
5′5′′ and 5′10′′ will always be excluded from the interpretation of tall, large degrees
such as 7′ will always be included, and an intermediate degree 6′ is 50% likely to
be included and is therefore a borderline case. In general, the larger the degree, the
more likely it is in the interpretation of tall.
Based on the similarities between up to n and tall, I propose that up to n also has
an unspecified semantic lower bound θ , whose value is contextually (probabilisti-
cally) determined. This straightforwardly captures the vagueness of up to n that we
observe in the previous section.
3.2 Inquisitive semantics implementation
In addition to its similarities to gradable adjectives, up to n has other empirical
properties, e.g., the requirement of speaker uncertainty in some linguistic environ-
ments (1a), which are different from gradable adjectives. I will adopt Coppock
& Brochhagen’s (2013) and Blok’s (2015a) analyses of these properties, which
are implemented in the inquisitive semantics framework (Ciardelli, Groenendijk &
Roelofsen 2009, 2012), but note that my analysis of the opposite inference patterns
of up to n does not hinge on the specific analyses of these other empirical properties
or the formal framework used for their implementations.
Whereas a declarative sentence denotes a proposition (a set of possible worlds) in
classical semantic theories, in inquisitive semantics, a declarative sentence denotes a
set of propositions, i.e., a set of sets of possible worlds. A nice feature of inquisitive
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semantics is that the classical denotation (truth condition) of a sentence can be
retrieved by applying set union to its denotation in inquisitive semantics. This makes
inquisitive semantics compatible with classical theories in terms of truth conditions,
while having more fine-grained representations to capture the different inference
patterns between expressions that have the same classical truth conditions.
I propose that up to n has the following semantics (6).
(6) Jup to nK= {λM〈d,t〉.max(M) = k | k ∈ [θ ,n]},
where θ is a contextual lower bound (0≤ θ < n).3
For example, the denotation of up to 100 is in (7), which is a set of functions.
(7) Jup to 100K= {λM〈d,t〉.max(M) = k | k ∈ [θ ,100]}
= {λM.max(M) = θ , λM.max(M) = θ +1, . . . ,λM.max(M) = 100}
θ is a contextual lower bound (0≤ θ < n)
For you are about to meet up to 100 people (1a), up to 100 takes scope over
the rest of the sentence, which is a degree property. After point-wise functional
application, we obtain a set of propositions. The derivation is shown in (8).
(8) Jyou are about to meet up to 100 peopleK
= Jup to 100K (λd.Jyou are about to meet d-many peopleK)
= {pθ , pθ+1, . . . , p100}
where θ is a contextual lower bound (0≤ θ < n) and pi is the proposition
that the listener is about to meet exactly i people.
The classical truth conditional content of (8) is the union of all the propositions,
which is the proposition that the actual number of people who will attend the
wedding, n0, is within the range [θ ,100]. In other words, the informative content
conveyed by (8) is that n0 ∈ [θ ,100]. The speaker asserts that the number is within
this range. Meanwhile, since θ < 100, the denotation of (8) always has at least two
alternatives. According to Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013) Maxim of Interactive
Sincerity, a cooperative speaker should not raise multiple alternatives if she already
knows which one is true. Therefore the speaker of (8) will violate this maxim if she
already knows the exact number of people, which explains the speaker-uncertainty
requirement of (8).
On the other hand, for you are allowed to meet up to 100 people (1b) in
authoritative-permission contexts, I adopt the common assumption in the litera-
ture that the permission modal scopes above up to n (Büring 2008; Coppock &
Brochhagen 2013; Kennedy 2015). The derivation is shown in (9).
3 To improve readability, I omit the intensional types when they are irrelevant, e.g., the degree property
M〈d,t〉 really is M〈s,〈d,t〉〉. Also I will abbreviate max({d |M(d)}) to max(M).
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(9) JYou are allowed to meet up to 100 peopleK= {♦Jyou meet up to 100 peopleK}
= {♦{pθ , pθ+1, . . . , p100}}
where 0≤ θ < 100 and pi is the proposition that you meet exactly i people.
Furthermore, it is well known that permission modals scoping above a set of
possibilities can trigger a free-choice inference (10), i.e., each possibility in the set
is allowed. This is independently observed in studies of the interaction between
permission modals and disjunctions (e.g., Kamp 1973, 1978; Zimmermann 2000;
Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002).
(10) ♦{pθ , pθ+1, . . . , p100} ♦pθ ∧♦pθ+1∧ . . .∧♦p100
However, various analyses of the free-choice inference disagree on whether the
nature of this inference is semantic or pragmatic. I will not engage in the debate
in this paper. The only assumption I will make is that the free-choice inference
takes place before the pragmatic mechanism that I am going to propose next. If
this inference is semantic entailment, then this is just a common assumption about
the semantics/pragmatics interface. If this inference is itself pragmatic, it might
seem unusual to assume that another pragmatic mechanism can happen after it.
However, note that many pragmatic accounts of the free-choice inference assume
that an expression can be used to defeat the implicature of an alternative expression,
which effectively allows for the result of a pragmatic inference to feed into another
pragmatic process anyways (e.g., Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Fox 2007; Franke
2011). Therefore it is viable to assume that the free-choice inference feeds into
another pragmatic mechanism, even if the free-choice inference itself is pragmatic.
The proposed semantics of up to n allows us to explain the speaker-uncertainty
requirement of (1a) by appealing to the Maxim of Interactive Sincerity. However,
we still need to solve the main puzzle, i.e., explaining the opposite inference patterns
in speaker-uncertainty and authoritative-permission contexts. Below, I will propose
a pragmatic mechanism to contextually determine the unspecified lower bound θ .
3.3 Pragmatic reasoning about the unspecified lower bound
The pragmatic mechanism to contextually determine the unspecified lower bound
I will propose is motivated by previous probabilistic models that aim at predicting
the contextual standard of comparison for gradable adjectives (Lassiter & Goodman
2013, 2015; Qing & Franke 2014a,b). I will introduce the basic idea of those analyses
below, and propose an adaptation to account for up to n. In the next section I will
spell out a primitive probabilistic model that makes concrete quantitative predictions,
which can be empirically tested in future studies.
Gradable adjectives are context-sensitive, e.g., a US adult male needs to be much
taller to be considered tall than a five-year-old. This means that the standard of
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comparison θ needs to be contextually determined and can change from context to
context. In addition, relative gradable adjectives, such as tall, are vague (Kennedy &
McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007).
As discussed in section 3.1, vagueness can be modeled probabilistically, i.e.,
instead of a fixed value, the context determines a probability distribution on the
standard of comparison θ . Therefore, once the context is fixed, the goal is to explain
and predict such a distribution, e.g., why the standard of comparison is most likely
to be among certain degrees than others.
The crucial idea behind the probabilistic models mentioned above is that the
standard of comparison should be a trade-off between informativity and applicability.
For instance, when we talk about adult males in the US, the informativity of a
standard of comparison θ is the information we will learn about the height of a
person after hearing that he is tall, i.e., his height h≥ θ . A higher θ makes the use of
tall more informative, because it narrows down that person’s possible heights more.
However, at the same time a higher θ will make tall less applicable, in the sense that
fewer people will be tall enough to qualify as tall. For example, if only people who
are at least 7′ can be described as tall, then it surely will be very informative when
someone is described as tall, but unfortunately most of us will probably not have
the chance to use it to describe anyone at all, which means that such a standard is
not very applicable. More precisely, in this case applicability is the probability that
the speaker can truthfully assert that a random person (sampled from the contextual
comparison class, e.g., US adult males) is tall. The higher the probability, the more
chances the speaker has to use tall, i.e., tall is more applicable.
From the perspective of efficient communication, expressions should ideally be
both as informative and as applicable as possible. However, as discussed above,
in the case of tall, the standard of comparison θ cannot optimize both at the same
time. The consideration of informativity pushes the standard of comparison to larger
degrees, while the consideration of applicability keeps it from being too large. As a
result, the standard of comparison for tall is likely to be a degree that is relatively
large in the context, but not unreasonably so. For example, for adult males in the
US, 6′1′′ might be a good trade-off between informativity and applicability, so are
6′ and 6′2′′, but not 5′5′′ (too uninformative) or 7′ (too inapplicable). This is why
the standard of comparison for tall in this context is likely to be 6′–6′2′′, but very
unlikely to be 5′5′′ or 7′.
I propose that we can analyze the contextual lower bound of up to n by similarly
consider the trade-off between informativity and applicability. However, the notions
of informativity and applicability need to be adapted, depending on the type of
contexts in which up to n is used.
First I consider you are about to meet up to 100 people (8). Let n0 be the actual
number of people that the listener is about to meet. The informative content is that
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n0 ∈ [θ ,100]. A θ that is close to 100 will result in a narrower range, and therefore
will make the sentence more informative.
Applicability is a little more complicated, because (8) needs to be both assertible
and felicitous. We know that (8) is felicitous only when the speaker is uncertain
about the exact number of people the listener will meet, n0. Since now the speaker
does not know the value of n0, assertibility is not about the objective truth, but rather
the speaker’s subjective belief. Let G be the set of all numbers of guests that the
speaker considers possible. In order for (8) to be assertible, we need G ⊆ [θ ,n].
Therefore, (8) is assertible iff G⊆ [θ ,n]. Applicability is defined as the probability
that (8) is assertible, i.e., the probability of G⊆ [θ ,n]. In order to calculate such a
probability, we need a probability distribution over G, which is from the contextual
information about the speaker’s level of uncertainty about the actual number n0.
For example, if the speaker’s information of the upcoming people is based on the
number of invitations she has sent, most of which have not been confirmed, then
she has a high level of uncertainty about n0 and therefore G is likely to have many
elements and the range [min(G),max(G)] is likely to be wide. On the other hand, if
the speaker just saw the crowd and spent some time to do some quick counting, then
she has a low level of uncertainty and hence G is likely to have just a few elements
and the range [min(G),max(G)] is likely to be narrow.
Note that once the contextual distribution over G is fixed, a larger θ will always
make the sentence less applicable. For instance, in the extreme case where θ = 99,
(8) asserts that the listener is about to see either exactly 99 or exactly 100 people,
which is highly informative, but it is assertible only when G ∈ {99,100}. Intuitively,
it seems generally very unlikely that the speaker would know the number of people
so well that they think this number can only be either 99 or 100. Therefore, the
applicability, which is the probability that G ∈ {99,100}, would be very low. Hence
a θ that is too large will be dispreferred because it makes the sentence less applicable.
As a result, in speaker-uncertainty contexts, assuming that the speaker is overall
informed but has residual uncertainty, when we take both informativity and applica-
bility into account, the most likely lower bound θ for up to n should be relatively
close to n (to be informative), but not unreasonably so (to still be applicable). Given
that the lower bound θ is likely to be close to n, only degrees that are close to n are
likely to be in the range [θ ,n]. Therefore up to n triggers a proximity inference in
unembedded sentences.
Now I consider the authoritative permission contexts for up to n under permission
modals, and take you are allowed to meet up to 100 people (9) as an example.
Recall that I assume that the free-choice inference takes place before the current
pragmatic considerations. Under this assumption, the informative content of (9)
is the conjunction ♦pθ ∧♦pθ+1∧ . . .∧♦p100 (where pi is the proposition that the
listener meet exactly i people). Therefore, a smaller θ , which corresponds to more
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conjuncts, will make the sentence more informative. For example, when θ = 10,
the listener will learn that meeting 10,11, . . . ,100 people are allowed, but when
θ = 50, the listener will only learn that meeting 50,51, . . . ,100 people are allowed,
and remains uncertain about whether meeting 10,11, . . . or 49 people is allowed. We
can see that the most informative θ would be 0, because it corresponds to the most
conjuncts in the informative content.
In terms of applicability, note that (9) is assertible as long as the speaker has
the authority, which is already the case for the class of relevant contexts we are
considering. Therefore applicability does not favor any particular value of θ .4
As a result, consideration of informativity prefers a small θ , and applicability is
not against it. Therefore the best θ would be 0 and the default interpretation is that
the full range [0,θ ] is allowed.
Therefore, I conclude that the opposite inference patterns of up to n in speaker-
uncertainty and authoritative-permission contexts can be understood as the result of
pragmatic reasoning about an unspecified semantic lower bound of up to n, subject
to a general principle of trade-off between informativity and applicability. The two
linguistic contexts differ in how the lower bound affects these two factors. This
analysis has solved the main puzzle of this paper in section 1.
4 A probabilistic model
In this section I will propose a probabilistic model to show that the previous discus-
sion can be formalized to make quantitative predictions. This primitive model has a
lot of simplifying assumptions, but it suffices to illustrate the main concept.
For speaker-uncertainty contexts, the main challenge is to measure applicability
quantitatively. This relies on the contextual information about the speaker’s level
of uncertainty about the actual number m. Ideally we would like to specify a
distribution over the speaker’s belief state G, i.e., the set of all the degrees that the
speaker considers possible. However, in practice it is hard to specify such a big
distribution, so I will make certain simplifications.
First, I will assume that the speaker’s belief state G is a range [a,b]. The speaker
chooses the upper bound n in her utterance of up to n based on a and b, and further
chooses the implicit lower bound θ .
4 Note that this is making the simplifying assumption that authority is a binary concept, i.e., either
the speaker has full authority or he does not. In situations in which there might be constraints from
a higher authority, the speaker may only have partial authority. In such cases, the consideration
of applicability will favor larger degrees, but the interaction with informativity will still result in a
relatively small optimal lower bound. For example, given what we know about passwords, you are
allowed to use up to 20 characters for your password might be permitting 6–20 characters. Similarly,
since 0 is known to be ruled out in many contexts, up to n is often interpreted as permitting 1 to n.
534
Up to n: Optimal lower bound
(11) a. p(m,a,b,θ ,n) = p(m,a,b) · p(n | m,a,b) · p(θ | m,a,b,n)
b. p(m,a,b,θ ,n) = p(m,a,b) · p(n | a,b) · p(θ | a,b,n)
According to the chain rule, we have (11a). Since the speaker does not know m
and chooses the bounds based on her own belief a,b, the bounds θ ,n are condition-
ally independent of m given a,b, and therefore (11a) can be reduced to (11b).
The model (11b) involves the choice of the upper bound n. Since we are more
interested in the conditional probabilities p(θ | n) and p(m | n), where n is already
given, the choice of the upper bound n is not particularly relevant. Also, the main
consideration in p(n | a,b) is informativity, which is the same as in p(θ | a,b,n).
Therefore, to simplify the model and highlight the informativity-applicability trade-
off of θ , which is our main interest, I assume that the speaker always chooses
n = b, i.e., n in up to n is the maximal number that the speaker considers possible.
Intuitively this is very plausible: if 100 is maximal number of people that the speaker
considers possible, then uttering you are about to meet up to 120 people is less
informative than you are about to meet up to 100 people and there is no reason for a
cooperative speaker to do that.5
This simplification helps us eliminate the variable b, and according to the chain
rule, we obtain (12a).
(12) a. p(m,a,θ | n) = p(m,a | n) · p(θ | m,a,n) = p(m,a | n) · p(θ | a,n)
b. p(a,θ | n) = p(a | n) · p(θ | a,n)
We are interested in the conditional distribution p(θ | n), therefore we should
marginalize over m and a. Marginalizing over m yields (12b). It has two parts:
p(a | n) encodes the contextual information about the speaker’s level of uncertainty,
and the second part reflects the informativity-applicability tradeoff.
First, recall that the sentence is assertible only when [a,b] ⊆ [θ ,n], i.e., the
semantic content of the utterance needs to be entailed by the speaker’s belief state.
This requires that θ ≤ a. Therefore, p(θ | a,n) = 0 when a < θ . When a ≥ θ ,
p(θ | a,n) depends on the informativity of θ , which is measured as the reduction
in uncertainty (entropy) the lower bound θ contributes. Without the lower bound,
the listener only knows that the number of people is between 0 and n, and therefore
the entropy is log(n+ 1), assuming a uniform prior. The lower bound θ narrows
down the range to [θ ,n], whose entropy is log(n+1−θ). Therefore the reduction
of entropy is log(n+ 1)− log(n+ 1−θ), as shown in (13a). We can see that the
larger the θ , the more informative it is.
5 Unless, of course, Quantity interacts with Manner. For instance, if 98 is the maximal number that the
speaker considers possible, she might sacrifice a little bit of information and use the simpler form up
to 100. This can be modeled by assigning higher costs to expressions with non-round numbers Kao,
Wu, Bergen & Goodman (2014).
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(13) a. Informativity(θ) = log(n+1)− log(n+1−θ)
b. p(θ | a,n) ∝ δa≥θ · Informativity(θ)λ
c. p(θ | n) = ∑a p(a | n) · p(θ | a,n)
∝ ∑a p(a | n) ·δa≥θ · Informativity(θ)λ
= ∑a≥θ p(a | n) · Informativity(θ)λ
= Informativity(θ)λ ·∑a≥θ p(a | n)
d. Applicability(θ) = ∑a≥θ p(a | n)
e. p(θ | n) ∝ Informativity(θ)λ ·Applicability(θ)
Now we can define p(θ | a,n) as in (13b), where δa≥θ is a delta function, which
returns 1 if a≥ θ and 0 otherwise, and λ is a parameter that captures the importance
of informativity in the choice of θ . If λ = 0, it means that informativity is not
considered, and when λ →+∞, it means that informativity is the only consideration.
Basically, (13b) says that the more informative a θ is, the more likely that it will get
chosen, as long as the corresponding sentence is assertible, i.e., θ ≤ a.
Now we can marginalize over a, and plug in the definition in (13b) to simplify
p(θ | n) in (13c). In the end we can see that p(θ | n) is depends on the product of
two terms. The first term is Informativity(θ)λ , which increases as θ increases. The
second term is ∑a≥θ p(a | n), i.e., the probability of a≥ θ , which is the probability
that the corresponding up to n sentence is assertible. This is precisely the definition
of applicability, as in (13d), and it decreases as θ increases. (13c) can be seen as the
informativity-applicability tradeoff, as shown in (13e).
In order for the above model to produce actual quantitative predictions, we need
to specify p(a | n), i.e., the conditional probability of the minimal possible number
considered by the speaker, given the maximal possible number n. This distribution
is contextually determined, and depending on the context various assumptions can
be made. Here, I will assume that this probability depends on n/a, i.e., the ratio
between the maximal possible number, and the log ratio is normally distributed. This
assumption seems plausible in many contexts, especially those that involve number
perception, because previous work in psychophysics has shown that our perception
is generally sensitive to ratios (see, e.g., Dehaene (2003) for more introduction and
discussion) For example, our perception of the difference between 10 and 12 dots
will be assumed more or less the same as the difference between 100 and 120 dots.
Assuming that p(a | n)= φ(log(n/a)), where φ(x) is a normal distribution shown
in Figure 1(a), which corresponds to a contextual assumption that the max/min ratio
is typically within 20%–50% and most likely around 35%.
When λ = 4, the predicted distribution of θ for you are about to meet up to 100
people is shown in Figure 1(b), but for a reasonable range of λ , the shape of the
curve is qualitatively the same: a larger λ will shift the curve slightly to the right and
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Figure 1 Model for you are about to meet up to 100 people
make it more concentrated, and a smaller λ will shift the curve slightly to the left
and make it more flat. For instance, Figure 2(a) shows the prediction when λ = 6.
This is the expected relation between the relative importance of informativity and the
likelihood that a degree will be used as the lower bound for up to n. From Figure 2(a)
we can see that the lower bound θ is seldom above 80 or below 50. This predicts
that after hearing you are about meet up to 100 people, it would be inappropriate for
the listener to say no, there are only 80, but it should be fine for the listener to say
no, there are only 50.6
Note that the prediction is based on the ratio to the upper bound n rather than the
difference. For example, we can see from Figure 2(b) that the shape of the curve is
the same for up to 10. This result is also intuitively plausible.
We have seen how the probability of the lower bound θ can be inferred from
the upper bound, i.e., p(θ | n). Quite often, we would also like to reason about the
actual number m. However, when we first marginalize over θ in (12a) and then over
a, we quickly realize that the lower bounds do not seem to have any impact on the
actual number, as shown in (14).
(14) a. p(m,a,θ | n) = p(m,a | n) · p(θ | m,a,n) = p(m,a | n) · p(θ | a,n)
6 Keep in mind that this prediction is based on the specific contextual assumption about the speaker’s
level of uncertainty (around 35%, which is quite high). If the listener believes that the level uncertainty
is lower, then no, there are only 80 would be a possible response.
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b. p(m,a | n) = p(m,a | n) Marginalize over θ
c. p(m | n) = p(m | n) Marginalize over a
This might look surprising at first, but it is actually plausible. Note that the actual
number does not directly determine the lower bound or the upper bound of up to n.
Its influence on the bounds, if any, is through the maximal and minimal numbers in
the speaker’s belief. Therefore, if no additional assumption is made to link the actual
number to the speaker’s belief, there is no way to infer “backward” and calculate
p(m | n).
To see this more clearly, note that by Bayes’ rule we have (15).
(15) p(m | n) ∝ p(m) · p(n | m)
Here p(m) is the prior of the actual number, and p(n | m) is the probability that
the maximal number that the speaker considers possible is n when the actual number
is m. This is the link from the reality to the speaker’s belief that we need to specify.
In the extreme case where n and m are totally independent. For instance, in a context
where the speaker chooses the commonly known absolute contextual maximum
as the upper bound, e.g., the full capacity of the room n = 100, then the listener
will gain no information at all from the utterance you are about to meet up to 100
people. In other cases, the speaker’s belief is formed by a noisy observation of the
actual number m, e.g., when talking about a place the speaker just left. In such
cases, the probability p(n | m) may be reasonably assumed to depend on the ratio
n/m and the log ratio is normally distributed. Of course, the mean and variance of
this distribution will be smaller than those of the log max/min ratio. Sometimes it
might be reasonable to assume that n/m and m/a are independently distributed with
identical distributions, which means that the mean and variance of n/a is twice as
much as those of n/m. In yet some other cases, it might actually be most natural
to directly estimate p(m | n). For example, if the maximal number that speaker
considers possible is based on the number of people who have responded “yes” or
“maybe” to the invitation, then the listener can use his general knowledge about the
typical attendance rate to directly estimate p(m | n).
This means that depending on additional contextual information about p(m | n)
or p(n | m), the listener’s inferred distribution of the actual number m after hearing
up to n can vary, and it is possible to infer, e.g., that 45 is most likely after hearing
up to 50.
Now I consider the authoritative-permission contexts of using up to n under
permission modals, and use you are allowed to meet up to n people as an example.
The sentence is assertible as long as the speaker is assumed to have authority.
Therefore, so long as the resulting meaning is sensible, the sentence will always be
applicable therefore I will assume that the applicability of θ is a constant (16a).
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Figure 2 Distribution of θ for you are about to meet up to n people, with λ = 6
(16) a. Applicability(θ) = 1
b. Informativity(θ) = (n+1−θ)∗ log2 = n+1−θ
c. Pr(θ) ∝ Informativity(θ)λ ·Applicability(θ )
The informative content is the big conjunction that meeting exactly θ ,θ+1, . . . ,n
people are all allowed. To simplify, I will assume that the listener initially is totally
ignorant about whether meeting i people is allowed for any number of i, and they are
all independent of each other. This means that for each i the entropy of the listener’s
belief is log22 = 1. After hearing the sentence, the listener has no uncertainty about
the status of θ ,θ +1, . . . ,n (since he learns that they are all allowed), which means
the entropy of the listener’s belief about each of these numbers is now 0. Therefore
the total reduction of entropy is n+1−θ , as shown in (16b). Finally the trade-off
between applicability and informativity is the same (16c), and I will use λ = 6.
Under the above assumptions, the predictions of the distribution of θ for up to
100 and up to 10 are shown in Figure 3.
In both cases, we can see that the most likely θ is 0 and the distributions are
monotonically decreasing. This corresponds to the intuition that the most likely
interpretation is that the full range is allowed, when there are no prior preferences
introduced from the context.
I want to emphasize that the purpose of introducing the probabilistic model is
mainly to illustrate that in principle we can make concrete, quantitative predictions
about the contextual distribution of the lower bound θ of up to n. This will enable
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Figure 3 Distribution of θ for you are allowed to meet up to n people, with λ = 6
us to evaluate the extend to which the proposal that θ is determined by a trade-off
between applicability and informativity captures the inference patterns of up to n
in different linguistic environments. Of course, as we have seen, it is not a trivial
task to formalize a probabilistic model. In building the model, I need to make a lot
of simplifying assumptions that may well be empirically incorrect. Future work is
needed to improve the model and test its quantitative predictions.
5 Discussion and comparison with previous work
5.1 Generalization to universal deontic modals
The proposed analysis of up to n can be generalized to explain its inference patterns
under universal deontic modals.
Nouwen (2008) claims that up to n is “not so happy with strong modals” (17).
(17) ?? Jasper is required to invite up to 10 children to his party.
Note that Nouwen intends up to 10 to take scope below the universal modal
in (17), which corresponds to the authoritative reading (the wide-scope speaker-
uncertain reading is perfectly fine here). While it is true that many native speakers
tend to find (17) odd, many similar naturally-occurring examples can be found (18).
(18) a. The squad must contain up to 25 players and have no more than 17 players
who do not fulfil the Home Grown Player criteria.
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b. These essays should present the authors’ arguments in a clear and structured
manner and should include up to 5 references. “In My View” contributions
are limited to 1200 words.
c. It was required that the answers link to at least one and up to 3 references
from the reference module.
d. [Q & A] What do I do if I receive a “warning” within the EMPLOYEE
STATE/PROVINCE field? This field may not be left blank and must
contain up to 2 characters of text.
These examples do not seem as weird and suggest that the oddity of (17) cannot
be explained simply as some semantic violation. As another example, in Cameron’s
proposal, as discussed in section 2 and repeated below in (19), up to n has a clear
upper bound and a vague non-zero lower bound that seems to be quite close to the
upper bound 20,000.7 Therefore it seems that the acceptability of up to n under
strong modals largely depends on the context.
(19) So Mr Speaker, we are proposing that Britain should resettle up to 20,000
Syrian refugees over the rest of this Parliament.
This high contextual variability is expected under the current analysis. Given
that the semantic content of up to n has an unspecified range [θ ,n], the weirdness of
(17) can be explained by considering informativity and applicability.
(20) a. J(17)K= {{pθ , pθ+1, . . . , p10}}
where pi is the proposition that Jasper invites exactly i children to his party.
b.{pθ , pθ+1, . . . , p10} 
∧
i/∈[θ ,10]¬♦pi
c. {pθ , pθ+1, . . . , p10} ♦pθ ∧♦pθ+1∧♦p10
First, as usual, we assume that in the authoritative reading the deontic modal
scopes above up to n. This time it is the necessity modal taking a set of alternative
propositions as its argument (20a). The classical logical property of deontic necessity
 dictates that anything outside of the informative content of its complement is
not allowed. Therefore, we know that (20a) entails that any number outside the
range [θ ,10] is not allowed (20b). Deontic necessity modals scoping above a set
of alternatives can also give rise to the free-choice inference, e.g., you are required
to eat an apple or an orange implies that eating an apple is allowed and eating an
orange is allowed. The result of the free-choice inference of (20a) is that inviting
any number within the range [θ ,10] is allowed (20c). Recall that I assume the result
7 Note that after the proposal is approved, we can use it is required that Britain resettle up to 20,000
refugees to report Britain’s commitment, which means up to n indeed takes scope below the modal.
541
Qing
of the free-choice inference feeds into the pragmatic mechanism that determines
θ , therefore (20b) and (20c) together completely settle whether inviting exactly i
children is allowed, for all the numbers. Therefore the informativity will be the
same for any θ and the choice of θ totally relies on applicability. As discussed
earlier, similar to permission modals, (20a) is assertible iff the speaker is taken to be
authoritative. Therefore, without further contextual information, the sentence will
always be applicable. Therefore any θ should be equally good. However, this means
that the informativity-applicability tradeoff does not prefer any θ . As a result, (17)
would be very ambiguous: if any θ is equally good, it would be hard to know what
exactly is allowed or required.
For naturally-occurring examples, the listener can resort to background world
knowledge to reasonably infer the intention of the speaker. This is much harder for
a decontextualized sentence such as (17): without enough background knowledge
about the kind of party Jasper has, we could not tell whether inviting only a few
children is allowed. I suggest that it is this great ambiguity that renders (17) odd.
5.2 Range of the lower bound
The current analysis of up to n is very similar to Blok’s (2015a) account, which also
posits a contextually determined lower bound (she uses s to denote it).
However, there are two crucial differences. First, in Blok’s semantics the lower
bound s of up to n can never be 0. Since Blok also requires that s < n, her semantics
predicts that up to one is never felicitous when 1 is the smallest non-zero number in
the underlying scale. This prediction agrees with Schwarz, Buccola & Hamilton’s
(2012) same descriptive generalization, which they refer to as the bottom-of-the-
scale effect (BotS). However, there are naturally-occurring examples of up to one in
various linguistic environments (21), where up to one arguably means 0 or 1, contra
Schwarz et al. (2012) and Blok (2015a).
(21) a. You are allowed to bring up to one guest.
b. The committee will submit up to one application.
c. Each panel should consist of a convener, up to four presenters, and up to
one respondent.
These examples suggest that 0 can be part of the semantic content of up to n,
which means that the lower bound can be 0. BotS, which seems to hold mostly for
simple episodic sentences, requires a pragmatic explanation.
Second, Blok only introduces the unspecified lower bound s in the semantics,
without providing a pragmatic mechanism of how it is contextually determined
or using the value of the lower bound to explain the proximity inference. In this
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sense, the current analysis is an extension of her account and makes more concrete
quantitative predictions.
5.3 Upper bound and comparison with at most n
A significant part of Blok’s proposal that I have not discussed is the differences
between up to n and at most n. In terms of the lower bound, I agree with her that up
to n differs from at most n in that only the former has an unspecified lower bound.
In terms of the upper bound, Blok proposes that, unlike at most n, up to n in fact
does not impose a semantic upper bound, which is not what I assume in this paper.
However, this is not a crucial assumption. As a crude descriptive generalization, I
think in most cases up to n patterns with bare numerals. This observation suggests
that the upper bound interpretation might come from the numeral part rather than up
to. All I need to assume is that it then feeds into the proposed pragmatic mechanism.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the opposite inference patterns of up to n in speaker-
uncertainty and authoritative-permission contexts. I argue that this puzzle can be
solved by postulating an unspecified, contextually determined lower bound θ in the
semantic content of up to n, together with a pragmatic mechanism to determine θ by
considering the trade-off between applicability and informativity.
In future work, I plan to conduct experiments to gather data on how people
interpret up to n (and other modified numerals) in order to test and improve the
probabilistic model.
Blok (2015a) surveys the counterpart of up to n in a variety of languages and
proposes cross-linguistic generalizations. Given that the English data considered in
this paper already suggest the need to revise her analysis, it would be informative to
check whether we can find corresponding examples in other languages. From some
preliminary, informal discussion with native speakers of several languages, I have
some evidence that some of the English data in this paper have counterparts in other
languages (e.g., there are similar counterexamples of the bottom-of-the-scale effect
in French, Italian, German, and Persian). The discussion has also revealed that the
matter can be rather complicated in some languages (e.g., Greek) and therefore we
need to be very careful when making cross-linguistic generalizations.
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